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Foreword
What happens when war upsets the normal 
life of peaceful communities? This bulletin 
tells the story o f community life in Iowa during 
the Great War o f 1917-18. Although this study 
was prepared during the summer o f 1941, before 
war actually was again upon us, we believe that 
it is even more timely than when it was written.
We wish to emphasize our sincere efforts to 
provide citizens with information which can be 
useful today. This usefulness would have been 
lessened had we refrained from the discussion 
of mistakes and confusion. Nations and com­
munities, like individuals, may profit both by a 
recognition o f mistakes and o f accomplishments.
Our objective has been neither to flatter nor 
to indict any community in its war effort, but 
rather to analyze what took place with a view 
toward even more effective civilian action in the 
new conflict. While our recommendations for  
current action are based primarily upon the 
study of the earlier war, it is our conviction 
that many of the problems and processes in com­
munity life will be re-lived in the current crisis.
Cooperative Extension W ork in Agriculture and Home Economics, Iowa State 
College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts and the United States Department o f  
Agriculture Cooperating. Extension Service, R . K . Bliss, director, Ames, Iowa. 
Distributed in furtherance of the Acts of Congress of May 8 and June 30, 1914.
Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic 
Arts, R. E . Buchanan, director, Ames, Iowa.
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SUMMARY
In time of war the community changes from a cluster of 
loosely bound organizations toward an integrated whole, 
each group related to each other one through the war pro­
grams. The pitch of social participation is greatly in­
creased both by greater activity in existing peacetime or­
ganizations and by the creation of numerous new organiza­
tions specifically organized for the community war effort.
More and more groups, old and new, put their shoulders 
to the wheel. Sewing, canning, parties for soldiers, band­
age rolling, food production and a multitude of other tasks 
are taken up energetically by local communities. Cam­
paigns in rapid succession strike the community with fever­
ish intensity. Rallies, send-off parties, demonstrations, flag 
ceremonies appear in a never ending stream enthusing peo­
ple to work on specific programs and revive their patriotic 
zeal.
This unification of organizations and the creation of the 
frame of mind consistent with it do not come over night; 
they are the product of weeks of service, conflicts of local 
interests, the overcoming of personal biases and selfishness, 
and, perhaps more importantly, the building of a war focus 
in the mind of each member of the community. Many prob­
lems arise in this transition.
Organizations do not agree on how they should function, 
people are frequently untrained for what they are to do, 
some of the work is not directly useful, leadership is drain­
ed off from the community by war demands. These and 
other problems may be expected in any attempt to integrate 
the peacetime community into a “war community.”
Along with modifications in social organization we find 
equally marked changes in attitudes and community opin­
ion. The variety of interests in the community is curtailed 
in favor of the dominant war issue. The criteria of success 
now applied to individuals and to organizations are not var­
ied as in peacetime; there is now one test, “Does it help to 
win the war?”
This unification in spirit is the outstanding quality. A 
desire and a demand for personal sacrifice arise, and, at
3
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the same time, the problem of making sacrifices equitable 
becomes even more difficult. As the war spirit grows, the 
non-contributors attract attention, and the possibilities of 
bitterness become more difficult for leaders to control. 
War, with its trials and bereavements, must inevitably be 
viewed with emotion, and an ever present problem is to 
prevent the emotionalism of wartime from handicapping 
rational war work— even as this same zeal stiffens the 
spirit in the community for further effort.
With growing unanimity and growing emotionalism, toler­
ation is difficult to preserve even where criticisms are con­
structive. People become more suggestible, accepting 
rumor as fact, and hopes as evidence. Even more danger­
ous from the long-time viewpoint is the reaction of war 
hate which in the last war was fostered by atrocity stories 
and flaming pictures. By these we may blind our reason 
in the heat of emotion and both wage war less effectively 
and demand a peace of retribution rather than one of world 
order.
Many of the problems felt in 1917-18 will plague us again 
in the present war. Many of the effective organization 
plans used then will again aid us in great achievements.
The epics of success and the fumblings of cross-purposes 
which make up the history of Iowa in 1917-18 can serve 
now to guide us as we unite with the nation on a new front.
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War Came To The Iowa Community
B y  C . A r n o l d  A n d e r s o n  a n d  B r y c e  R y a n 1
On April 6, 1917, the United States of America declared 
war. Throughout the country communities marshalled 
forces to meet the situation. Today the United States is 
engaged in another war, which is creating problems of so­
cial and economic war planning on dimensions greater than 
those of the war in 1917-18.
As the defense effort expands each community will face 
a notable increase in organized group activities, in new inte­
grating organizations, heightened enthusiasm expressed in 
rallies and campaigns, new regulations of private lives.
Everyone today recognizes that war involves readjust­
ments in our society. Economic and political adjustments 
are obviously serious. Equally drastic are the necessary 
modifications in family life, in churches, in recreation, in 
education, in the innumerable activities which in peacetime 
follow so normal a routine that we accept them as a matter 
of course. These problems are no less vital to the welfare 
of our people than the effects of war upon land values and 
prices of farm products. The preservation of a democratic 
way of life depends upon the actions and attitude of all 
members of the nation in their local communities. The 
successful adjustment of individuals to these changes, and 
the organization of our energies for effective prosecution 
of the war require an understanding of the problems which 
will be involved.
A classification and tabulation of events recorded in is­
sues of the Des Moines Register from April 6, 1917 through 
Nov. 11,1918, provided an index of community participation 
not only in the city itself but also in many of the small com­
munities of Iowa.3 In addition we have drawn from Iowa
»Project 383 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station.2 Assistant Professors of Sociology.
3 W e ignored all news items not referring specifically to Iowa. W e aid not in­
clude strictly business or financial items, nor certain categories such as the detailed 
operation of the army draft or the daily grist of news from Camp Dodge.
Our charts are not to be taken as accurate measures of the actual number of 
events of any type occurring everywhere in Iowa, but rather as indexes to m e 
relative importance o f one kind of happening compared to another type and the 
relative importance of different types of events at different times. No doubt Des 
Moines is overweighted in our data, but we believe our picture is essentially accurate 
for Iowa.
5
Anderson and Ryan: War came to the Iowa community
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1942
222
Fig. 1. Fluctuations in all wartime activities reported for Iowa 
communities.
Chronicles of the World War published by the State His­
torical Society.
A preview of the intense and spirited participation of 
Iowa communities in the war is shown in fig. 1. Several 
features stand out. The declaration of war led to a rapid 
crescendo of patriotic ceremonies and service which quickly 
faded out by summertime. Then the intensity of work 
picked up through the autumn until Christmas. This ef­
fort failed to gain more, barely holding its own until a new 
high level was reached in the spring. Once more the sum­
mer months witnessed a decline in citizen contributions. 
The new autumn rise was cut short by the flu epidemic in 
October, 1918. Although the seasonal changes in activity
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were quite similar in both years, the general level of 1918 
was distinctly above 1917.
In order to deal with the complexity of community activ­
ities we have divided our discussion into four main parts. 
First, we ask what happened to the existing organizations, 
what new organizations appeared, and how all the activities 
of these groups were carried on and interrelated? Second, 
what were the shortcomings in the pursuit of unified com­
munity effort for the preservation of a democratic world? 
Third, how were campaigns, rallies and ceremonies used to 
further the war effort ? And fourth, what were the atti­
tudes and sentiments of the members of these communities 
in wartime ? Finally, we have attempted to draw from this 
information recommendations which would be of use in con­
ducting present day civilian defense activities with maxi­
mum speed and efficiency and a minimum of suffering.
If we are prepared in our minds for the changes which 
the emergency will bring and foresee the adjustments 
which will be called for, we shall be able to make the ad­
justments more easily. This preparation can facilitate 
carrying on new activities more promptly and more cap­
ably. Not least important, we can avoid some of the fum­
bling and disorganization and some of the misunderstand­
ing and bitterness which flourish in haste and anxiety and 
unguided enthusiasm. Foresight and planning can aid us 
in preserving our democracy while defending it.
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN WARTIME
Churches, women’s clubs, chambers of commerce, lodges, 
schools, these and all the many other organizations in the 
typical community were wrenched out of their normal chan­
nels to find their purposes and activities reoriented in the 
wartime society. Beside them grew up new groups and 
new branches of old groups—a food administration, new 
local branches of the Red Cross, clubs of girls to entertain 
soldiers, many other large organizations and spontaneous 
local groups. What were these group changes as they 
actually worked out in World War I and as we may in large 
part anticipate them for the present crisis ?
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CHANGES AW AY FROM PEACETIME PROGRAMS IN  
EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS
War Goals Permeate Every Group
With the call to arms in 1917 there was the beginning of 
a tremendous impetus to forsake the programs of peace­
time, to forget the individual goals of peacetime organiza­
tion, and to unite in an all-out front to “win the war.” 
Questions such as these were heard on the lips of citizens 
on every street comer: “What can we do in our lodge to 
help win the war?” , “How can the ladies’ aid be of the most 
assistance to the Red Cross?” , “ Should our bridge club 
change to a sewing society?” At the minimum, programs 
already under way were justified as having new value be­
cause they contributed to war plans.
Religious doctrines changed their emphasis from loving 
your neighbor to defending democracy, “ It is God who has 
summoned us to this war. It is His war we are fighting 
. . . This conflict is indeed a crusade. The greatest in his­
tory—the holiest. It is in the profoundest and truest sense 
a Holy War . . .”—an unfortunate neglect of the problems 
of a Christian peace. Missionary societies clothed Belgian 
orphans as well as Hottentots. Recreation was not merely 
pleasure or protection of health; it was keeping fit so that 
one could become a soldier or give longer hours to war 
work. Schools became the seedbeds of democracy as well 
as training grounds for individual talents. Women’s clubs 
became guardians of the home front instead of personal 
recreational associations.
Each Organization Separately Takes on War Activities
Parallel Work on Similar Tasks
In the first tumult of a war emergency each group start­
ed out separately to make its contribution. There were 
certain obvious ways in which assistance was needed, and 
these activities therefore tended to appear .simultaneously 
and independently in the programs of different groups. 
Almost every group became an agency for selling war bonds, 
Red Cross memberships, collecting food pledges, listening 
to 4-minute speakers, reporting disloyal statements.
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Jan. 24, 1918 — Courtesy Des Moines Register
Particularly striking was the way the Red Cross move­
ment permeated the typical women’s organizations with 
practically a single purpose—Sew for Soldiers. Whereas 
in April, 1917, very few organizations could have put sew­
ing as one of their central objectives, we find already by 
July “ sew, sew, sew” had become the watchword. Figure 
2 indicates how this new objective swept across the social 
life of Iowa. Frequently the objectives of peacetime were 
forgotten or postponed.
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Fig. 2. Fluctuations in Red Cross activities reported for Iowa com­
munities.
Search for Unique Ways of Contributing
Each group also sought to show its special fitness to 
serve by launching its own plans in addition to sharing in 
some comprehensive program like Red Cross sewing. One 
club conceived the idea of collecting “ smokes for soldiers,” 
another collected field glasses. Some groups served by 
gathering junk or old clothing, others made curtains for 
hospital wards, others collected reading material and phono­
graphs. The Des Moines Chamber of Commerce had 16 
different committees working on Camp Dodge problems. 
Beginning with the Christmas season of 1917 soldier parties 
and benefits became a constant part of the social calendar.
Relation Between New and Old Activities
Some organizations such as sewing circles made their con­
tributions primarily by doing more of the things they were 
already doing. Other groups continued existing programs 
but expanded the total of their programs by adding new 
war activities.
The wartime goal became, for many of these organiza­
tions, far more time consuming and the cause of more ex-
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penditure of energy than the peacetime programs had ever 
occasioned. The Food Conservation and the Red Cross pro­
grams, soldier parties, benefits, etc. were taken on in addi­
tion to their usual functions. Many organizations compro­
mised with the emergency by holding two or more meetings 
per week, one of which would be devoted to club affairs, and 
some organizations set aside a portion of their afternoon 
meetings for war activities. In the extreme case, previous 
programs were completely displaced by war work.
Division of Labor
As war progressed, the necessity for planning to avoid 
unnecessary duplication and to make sure that all vital 
needs were taken care of became more urgent.
The single goal of “winning the war”  became many goals, 
and as the war effort became more strenuous these became 
more diversified and less like the familiar tasks. Winning 
the war became not only sewing for the Red Cross, produc­
ing or conserving food, but also entertaining soldiers, deal­
ing with the social hygiene problem, teaching wounded 
soldiers new occupations, selling a bond to every citizen, and 
innumerable others. Gradually these jobs Were parcelled 
out among various groups, although some (such as sewing) 
were widely shared in. Some groups were able to aid in a 
great number of programs. Not even at the end of the war 
was the allocation of these multiple tasks organized most 
efficiently, but this was the tendency.
A  certain conformity to usual activity prevailed in this 
division of labor: women took over sewing, children collect­
ed fruit pits, chambers of commerce spread knowledge of 
new regulations of the food industries, the schools develop­
ed adult education programs in cooking and canning, and 
farm bureaus organized to meet the demands for food.
Effects of W ar Upon Schools and Education:
An Illustrative Case
With so many new problems and new activities, it is 
hardly to be expected that the major institutions of society 
could proceed in their accustomed paths untouched. The 
whole fabric of family relations is subjected to new strains. 
Political institutions are reorganized to carry the new bur-
11
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den. The church must harmonize its doctrines of peace 
with the moral decision of its members to wage war.
There is not sufficient space to analyze each of these sit­
uations in turn, even though one cannot fully understand 
why war is so productive of social change without tracing 
these changes through the whole of society. Instead, we 
will show how the educational system of Iowa reacted to 
the war, as reported in the newspaper.
The most noteworthy adjustments of schools to the war 
came in three areas: Curricular change, staff and enroll­
ment, and participation in general patriotic activities.
Curricular changes were many. Athletic programs were 
sharply reduced. Some subjects were dropped, of which 
the most conspicuous was German. This action took place 
at first in particular localities upon the initiative of princi­
pals, parents, patriotic societies, or students—in some cases 
students refused to continue their work. Later the gover­
nor ordered all such teaching stopped. Students received 
full credit even for uncompleted work. The ban on use of 
all foreign languages in public did not apply to the schools 
except for German. Colleges, however, continued to teach 
German and defended its importance for military efficien­
cy. One is startled to read in the papers of the day numer­
ous pleas to study South American languages and history 
to prepare for the coming reorientation of American trade 
and cultural intercourse. Apparently few schools took up 
this suggestion.
Military training was introduced in several colleges, and 
this practice became uniform with the Student Army Train­
ing Corps in 1918. The diversion of time to drill was at 
the expense of academic subjects. Although there were 
many proposals to carry the plan down into the high 
schools, this apparently occurred in only a few places. In 
some instances women and girl students also drilled.
Courses were reoriented in two general ways. Many sub­
jects received new content based upon the war, e.g. courses 
in history focused on the current war. Home economics 
classes rather generally turned from personal sewing to 
Red Cross work, and cooking centered on conservation re­
cipes.
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The second modification consisted of adding new courses 
or new study projects of various kinds. First aid and nurs­
ing classes were introduced quite extensively in both high 
school and college. Gardening was perhaps the most gen­
eral project of all. Special training courses and summer 
schools were set up in auto mechanics, telegraphy, steno­
graphy, food conservation, thrift lessons and many other 
subjects of pressing importance. The colleges also offered 
intensive courses in the above subjects, a definite departure 
from the type of subject previously offered, as well as 
coaching-schools in French, geography, etc. The colleges 
also assumed responsibility for a diversified educational 
program at Camp Dodge.
Of particular significance as an indication of the atti­
tudes of educational administrators and public leaders was 
the addition to the curriculum of new courses in loyalty, 
patriotism and war. Teachers’ conventions discussed little 
except the war.
These many additions to the classwork of pupils plus the 
taking on of many outside activities undoubtedly contri­
buted to deterioration of learning in the established courses 
of study.
The main effects upon school enrollments were withdraw­
als in the spring of 1917 to enlist in the army and to work 
on farms. Pleas to young men to continue their schooling 
in college for the good of the nation until they should be 
needed by the army had considerable effect, and the estab­
lishment of the S.A.T.C. in the fall of 1918 kept college en­
rollments higher than could have been expected. School 
officials carried through many plans for granting high 
school boys full credits in courses even though they left 
school weeks early to work on farms. When the war ended 
plans were afoot to stop school in April in order to release 
needed labor.
In addition to the interruptions of school work by various 
campaigns and projects and the shortened period of study 
just mentioned, the duration of schooling was cut by other 
factors growing out of the war. The Christmas vacations 
of 1917 were lengthened in many towns and colleges to con­
serve fuel, and in January of 1918 numerous schools were
13
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forced to recess by lack of coal. Then in the fall of 1918, at 
first town by town and then for the whole state, special va­
cations were ordered to halt the spread of influenza. In 
some towns the schools went on a 6-day schedule to offset 
these losses of time but this was not a general practice. ..
Schools lost staff members as well as pupils. Many prin­
cipals and men teachers resigned to enlist, and, of course, 
many more were taken later by the draft. College presi­
dents were granted leaves to serve the government, as were 
many professors.
Newspaper items of the period seldom refer directly to 
losses of women from the teaching profession, but indirect 
statements show that some were drawn off into civic posi­
tions as nurses or home demonstration agents, and many 
more were attracted away by wartime wages to positions 
in industry or business. It was reported that over 150 
schools in Iowa had no teachers in the fall of 1917. Some 
schools probably did not open at all that year, but various 
special measures relieved the emergency— undoubtedly at 
the cost of efficiency. Although many people proposed 
combining schools, little of this occurred. Teachers col­
leges shortened courses so that students would be available 
for positions sooner. The main recourse apparently was to 
call back retired teachers and those who had married and to 
relax the standards for requirements of teachers. Special 
exceptions in favor of war brides were common.
This picture of the interlocking of the schools with the 
whole war effort is not complete without considering the 
great variety of school activities whose main function was 
to build up pariotism in the whole community or to further 
some civic campaign. A simple example was the general 
use of school buildings for meetings of every type and of 
school yards for gardens.
Patriotic rituals and ceremonies, as opening school each 
day with a flag raising or the singing of the Star Spangled 
Banner, multiplied rapidly. Holidays received new and in­
creased attention. Classrooms were organized on a military 
plan in some schools. Every school was expected to fly a 
flag.
Symbolic actions of many kinds increased. These ranged
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from discharging “ disloyal”  teachers to burning German 
books or tearing German songs out of the songbooks. Dis­
cipline in some schools acquired a new and disturbing as­
pect; cases were recorded of recalcitrant pupils or indig­
nant parents allegedly accusing teachers of pro-Germanism 
because a child had been punished for some offense or had 
been given low marks. Proposals—apparently none of 
them carried out— to clothe girls in uniforms as a measure 
of thrift and a gesture of democracy were essentially sym­
bolic in character. Some fraternities were temporarily dis­
banded. Particularly interesting examples of the psycho­
logical effects of patriotism were the drives to raise endow­
ment funds for colleges as aids to democracy.
The use of school pupils to aid wartime campaigns would 
include the taking of the pig census, organizing Junior Red 
Cross chapters, knitting during recess or after school hours 
as well as in school time, staging benefits for various war 
funds, organizing On-to-Berlin Savings Stamp Clubs, col­
lecting “ smokes for soldiers,”  or cooperative buying of 
bonds. Public interest in campaigns was stimulated by 
essay contests on conservation or patriotism, and by junior 
4-minute speaking competitions.
One deplorable feature recorded for the war period was 
the occasional use of children to report on the loyalty of 
teachers and in at least one case to scurry through the com­
munity to ferret out or investigate suspected slackers. Of 
the same nature was the persecution by children of their 
fellow pupils who were so unfortunate as to be the children 
of allegedly unpatriotic parents. That a teacher would use 
such pupils as object lessons in the classroom was perhaps 
the best example of the penetration of emotionalism into 
every phase of life.
The many patriotic ceremonies and activities of the last 
war unquestionably harmed the schools’ educational effec­
tiveness. Should children in the lower grades be learning 
lessons instead of soliciting for money, learning patriotic 
rituals only to be forgotten when war ends, taught conser­
vation practices adapted to war economy—when their 
knowledge is primarily for future, not for immediate, use? 
Are we justified in excusing children from school to work
15
Anderson and Ryan: War came to the Iowa community
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1942
232
W hen a Feller Needs a Friend <Copyt,5 ^ . , ' L hns ,Tr,bun*  By BRIGGS1
in the fields because of threatened labor shortage? Are 
we justified in making wholesale modifications in lower 
grade curricula due to war interests ? These questions are 
not to be answered by sociologists ; they must be answered 
by citizens. Unfortunately the questions are seldom posed, 
and once in the war situation it is all too easy to forget non-
16
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war values in organizational functioning. We must ask 
ourselves how far we may wish to go in harming the normal 
education of children in the process of building war morale 
and action.
Winning the war, we must all agree, is the number one 
task of a nation at war. But at the same time there persist 
from normal days additional objectives which cannot be 
completely sacrificed toward the war goal. (If all other 
objectives are sacrificed a nation cannot but be defeated by 
its own success—the reason for fighting the war disap­
pears.) Many organizations perform tasks that cannot be 
forgotten even in time of war. So, while at first the prob­
lem is to get more war activities into more organization 
programs— as we have pointed out—soon the problem be­
comes one of deciding which organizations or which activi­
ties to insulate from the disruptions and emotionalism of 
war.
RISE OF NEW  ORGANIZATIONS
New Local Branches of Existing National Organizations
The expansion of the Red Cross to meet war needs was 
very rapid and very dramatic. While this organization was 
not unknown to Iowans before the war, the fact is that 
there were only nine Red Cross Chapters in Iowa in 1916. 
However, a month after war was declared (May) there were 
24 chapters; one month later (June) there were 75, and by 
October, 167. Red Cross auxiliaries and branches were also 
organized in conjunction with these official chapters. On 
the first of August, 1917, there were 430 such branches, 
and at the close of the war over 1,200. In addition, train­
ing schools were established for home relief service, making 
surgical dressings and other activities. In Des Moines new 
Red Cross organizations appeared very rapidly just after 
the declaration of war, but few were formed during the fol­
lowing summer. In the fall of 1917 organizing grew again 
but dwindled until the great campaign month of May, 1918. 
At no time did new Red Cross organizations appear as 
rapidly, however, as in 2 months following our entrance into 
the war.
These figures reveal very inadequately how deeply this
17
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new organization penetrated into Iowa with ever increas­
ing thoroughness, forming a new grouping within virtually 
every rural community and linking each community with 
others throughout the nation. There were reported for 
Scott County 21,000 Red Cross members in 15 divisions in 
addition to the members of 20 rural branches throughout 
the county. Auxiliaries were found also in public and 
parochial schools, churches and other affiliated organiza­
tions.
While there were few other single expansions so dramatic 
as the Red Cross, the cumulative effect of the expansions 
of other groups was tremendous. The Federated Women’s 
Clubs, the Business Clubs, United Commercial Travelers, 
W.C.T.U., and Women’s Relief Corps extended their local 
activities and set up many new branches. Children as well 
as adults were mobilized for the emergency. Junior Red 
Cross societies appeared in the majority of schools, new 
Boy or Girl Scout troops were formed, both new and old 
troops doing notable work in many communities as mes­
sengers and clean-up squads in various drives. The 
Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. expanded their work.
One of the proudest chapters in Iowa’s history is the 
rise of farmers to the war crisis. Through the Extension 
Service and the farm bureaus farmers organized to meet 
the challenge that "Food will win the war.”  When war 
was declared 27 counties had organized farm bureaus and 
employed county agents. In less than a year every county 
in the state had at least one farm bureau. By July 1, 1918, 
33,187 farmers belonged to the farm bureaus. In addition 
the wives of these men and nearly 5,000 additional women 
were working with home demonstration agents. The pro­
gram was brought to the actual farmers through the 14,000 
farm cooperators, one for each 4 square miles. Through 
this vast organization the federal government through the 
Agricultural Extension Service was able to reach the farm­
ers of the state. And through it, too, farmers were able to 
meet successfully the enormous demands for food, the seri­
ous seed com situation, the ravages of cholera, and the 
placement of farm laborers.
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New National Organizations Create Local Units 
To meet some of the special demands arising from the 
emergency, new national organizations were formed which 
then established local units throughout the nation. The 
variety of these was noteworthy. Several organizations at­
tempted to coordinate women’s activities: National league 
for Women’s Service, Women’s Committee for National De­
fense, Women’s Volunteer Aid, Camp Mothers’ Association, 
and War Mothers of America. The Victory Boys and Girls 
Clubs, the Boys Working Reserve, Little Brothers of Sol­
diers, Girls Volunteer Aid organized the children. The War 
Camp Community Service established branches to provide 
recreation for soldiers. Doctors organized in Volunteer 
Medical Service Corps, and dentists joined forces in the 
Preparedness League of American Dentists. Loyal citizens 
of Teutonic origin affirmed their loyalty through the Ger- 
man-American Patriotic Association.
The National Food Administration permeated each com­
munity, and nearly every group, as thoroughly as the Red 
Cross. Each county was expected to set up a committee 
under the State Food Administration, usually affiliated 
with the county Council of National Defense. It was the 
function of this administration to reach every single home 
and bring to every family a realization of the crisis in order 
to gain the cooperation of every producer and housewife. 
This new organization probably extended itself into more 
homes in every community than any other board. The 
fact that there were about seven separate divisions of the 
Food Administration whose sole concern was reaching the 
public gives some indication of the program’s scope.
Spontaneous New Local Groups 
Many groups sprang up locally. Some of these grew out 
of the effort to put across a campaign. Liberty Loan cam­
paigns, for example, necessitated organizations on a com­
munity level. These were often complex groups with city 
teams, township teams and coordinating officers on city 
and county level. Each of the five campaigns necessitated 
such organizations, although many of the staffs held steady 
throughout all campaigns. Liberty Loan and “ slacker”
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courts were called into being to decide problems in the 
justice of assessments on different individuals. Societies 
for the singing of patriotic music appeared. Groups form­
ed to give dances, smokers, games, dinners for soldiers. 
Public libraries offered new services and even organized 
children’s clubs to aid.
One could name organizations at length, groups varying 
in size, scope, importance and efficiency. Naturally, not 
all of these were to be found in any one community, unless 
in Des Moines, but a large number arose and flourished and 
perhaps died out in every county.
COORDINATION OF W AR  W ORK IN  THE COMMUNITY
When war came each group tried to contribute, at first 
by independent work and by paralleling the same program 
with * many other groups. Gradually each organization 
tended to do the job it was best suited for, and this division 
of labor was stimulated and guided by major programs like 
the Red Cross.
Not only were objectives and programs greatly modified, 
but unlike the individualism of organizational life in peace­
time, organizations, clubs, societies and churches were inte­
grated, and in some communities we could almost say amal­
gamated into a functioning whole. Each group was not 
pursuing its course alone; it was united and integrated with 
all other organizations of the community, thus welding 
them into a siiigle machine with many functioning parts. 
While this was not true everywhere it was definitely the 
type of community life toward which Iowa was going. This 
integration was brought about by a number of agencies 
such as the Red Cross, Federated Women’s Clubs and the 
Food Administration. Around even these integrating 
agencies were the county defense councils which sought to 
integrate the integrators.
In August, 1917, the Food Administration was establish­
ed, and shortly thereafter it too began to function both 
through existing organizations and through the formation 
of county food administrations. Commencement addresses 
in the schools emphasized conservation—not future careers; 
college home economics advisors distributed literature on
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food conservation; school children left their books to serve 
in a variety of ways. The Chautauquas were quickly con­
verted from their semi-religious recreational functions into 
powerful units for making people food conscious. Food con­
servation became a new cardinal point in the objectives of 
virtually every organization, and as time went on often out- 
shadowed their previous peacetime objectives. Over 12,000 
organizations in Iowa are known to have been affiliated 
with the Food Administration in putting the program 
across. These included 2,870 church congregations in 
12 different denominations, 7,100 lodges representing 19 
different fraternal orders; 617 units of five associations of 
traveling men and nearly as many women’s clubs. “The 
principal work of the home demonstration agents during the 
war was to organize the housewives of the state in order 
to carry out the appeals of the national government for 
food conservation . . . ”
Another interesting example of integration of activities 
was the work of the War Camp Community Service. This 
agency also organized new local units and utilized existing 
groups to provide entertainment and various welfare pro­
grams for soldiers.
The County Councils of National Defense had their be­
ginning soon after war was declared and were devised as 
clearing houses for all war activities and frequently for 
other specific purposes as the suppression of sedition, in­
vestigating violations of war laws and orders, providing 
education on the war, stimulating and organizing patriotic 
meetings, etc.
In addition to the county councils there were also Wo­
men’s Committees for National Defense which coordinated 
women’s groups in promoting various war drives. These 
committees cut across the Food Administration and the Red 
Cross, and they quickly became articulated with the defense 
councils. To these organizations was given the tremendous 
task of integrating civilian war effort locally. Perhaps 
more frequently they served as all-purpose assisters rather 
than integrators.
An important feature of this spurt of organizing and 
coordinating, and one which has had enduring significance
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for rural life, was an offshoot of the centralizing tendencies 
inherent in the national war effort. Certain agencies be­
came leaders, and the others were arrayed below in various 
levels according to presumed or proved efficiency, the im­
portance of the job being done, or enjoyment of semi-offic­
ial status, as in the organization of an army. This tendency 
was fostered also by the set-up of some organizations em­
bracing national, regional, state, district, county, township, 
municipal, and precinct and block staffs. Two interesting 
examples of the development of such, a hierarchy were the 
assumptions by women’s groups of guidance over girl’s 
groups and by chambers of commerce over subordinate 
agencies set up to assist business men.
Thus we have a picture of the development of more social 
participation by Iowans than they had ever known before. 
More and more people were joining more and more organi­
zations ; there were more calls upon time by organizations, 
more working with other people, and, most important of 
all, more coordinated working between groups. In a some­
times rambling and often ill-defined manner, nearly all the 
old organizations and all of the new ones were on the way 
to becoming a part of the war effort. This unification and 
for the most part voluntary loss of group autonomy in war 
time is clearly evident both from newspaper accounts and 
from war histories of organizations and of counties. The 
new national organizations supplied objectives* programs, 
and through their local associations were integrating vir­
tually all other groups around these various plans. Never 
before in Iowa’s history had the community changed from 
a miscellaneous collection of independent organizations to 
anything approaching such a cohesive unity. In fact, the 
idea of community councils was invented or adopted widely 
during the war and has remained a permanent part of com­
munity life in many places. Through such procedures 
separate group programs could be more carefully delimited, 
unattended needs assigned, and a spirit of joint accomplish­
ment fostered.
This surge of collective action stands in sharp contrast 
to the easy going “participate or not” attitude of peacetime,
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in sharp contrast also to the individualization and self cen­
tered activities of peacetime, and to the great variety of 
group purposes and programs of peacetime. The war had 
broadened participation, narrowed the focuses of interest, 
and integrated organizations around national and state 
drives, campaigns and patriotic programs.
LAGS AND GAPS IN  WAR. PROGRAMS 
Difficulty in Integrating Activities
We must realize, however, that these changes did not 
come over night nor was the transition equally swift in dif­
ferent communities. The first public reaction to the com­
ing of war was expressed in the patriotic rallies and 
“hooplas,”  in reactions against disloyal remarks, and in 
similar non-specific ways. Very quickly groups and in­
dividuals expressed their determination to help the nation 
to the limit of their abilities. Actual service, however, was 
slower to appear. Just as in any crisis, people milled 
around asking how they might serve. Thus soon after war 
started the Des Moines . . . Clubs, announced that they 
were waiting to find the biggest thing they could do for 
soldiers.
America is not organized on a war basis in peacetime, 
and it is only natural that the appearance of war would find 
us unprepared for utilizing civilians most efficiently. Lack­
ing proper integration, the Osiris Club and the Morning 
Helpers were both making soldier kits but no one was 
making bandages so to speak. Many desirable tasks were 
begun late because sewing was “ the rage.”
Conflicts and Disputes
Rivalry between organizations or communities was a 
powerful incentive to energetic labor, but too frequently 
rivalry became conflict. In rivalry the objective of each 
contestant is to outdo the other in reaching a common goal; 
in conflict one contestant strives for a goal at the expense 
of his “ rival.”  When people become highly emotionalized 
over the goals they are seeking, patriotism itself can be per­
verted into a fallacious desire to monopolize contributions of
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a certain type.4
Probably the most serious handicap to Red Cross organi­
zing in Iowa grew out of too frequent disputes between dif­
ferent towns within a county as to which would have the 
chartered county headquarters and which would be 
branch organizations. This may sound trivial, but in many 
communities this conflict seriously impeded the work. In 
part it was an outcome of the attempt made by the Red 
Cross to keep only one chartered central agency in a county, 
and indeed from the standpoint of organization integration 
it is understandable that each neighborhood and village 
group could not deal directly with the National or State 
Red Cross headquarters. Civic loyalty and pride which 
might have been turned toward the benefit of the organiza­
tion by advance planning resulted very frequently not in 
healthy competition but in bitter disputes and occasionally 
in attempts to sabotage the work of other chapters.
A similar situation arose within communities where 
cliques attempted to “ comer” particular drives and pro­
grams as the private program of their groups. In one com­
munity, for example, a small clique obtained the Red Cross 
charter to the great dissatisfaction of many citizens who 
wanted to participate. A public meeting was called at 
which the “clique” agreed to surrender its charter to a truly 
representative community organization. After the meet­
ing the clique refused to surrender, and at a late date this 
community got the Red Cross into action only by virtue of 
having the state headquarters cancel the original charter. 
In another community an independent society was organ­
ized apart from and in competition with the Red Cross. 
The situation became so bitter and harmful that the dis­
trict attorney ordered the malcontents to cease operations.
Efficiency Versus Enthusiasm
Many organizations also had to deal with innumerable in­
stances of simple inefficiency. Let us quote from the Cen­
tral Red Cross Division Bulletin:
“Will Chapters kindly inspect their shipments a little more
1 Here> a.s at many other points, study of the faults or the lost motion of Iowa 
communities is not to be interpreted as a denial of the overwhelming patriotism and 
usually sane behavior.
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thoroughly before sending to us? We find many trousers 
of the pajamas without drawstrings, and jackets without 
any buttons or buttonholes . . .  In one shipment recently 
received there were sixty pairs of bed socks, all too short 
to go on a man’s f o o t . . . ”
Poor instructions and lack of integration between head­
quarters and branches partly explain this situation, but we 
would point out another factor which improved integration 
was powerless to overcome. The intense patriotism of the 
women working was, in fact, indirectly responsible for many 
blunders when it developed into the attitude expressed as 
“Ten stitches with love are worth 100 stitches with un­
concern.” In the zeal for service people tended to exag­
gerate the importance of “good intentions” in comparison to 
utility. Thus in a report of one county’s Red Cross organi­
zation we find the statement:
“These articles were the products of women’s hands, and by 
the same token, infinitely more precious than could have 
been the output of factories or machines.”
However true such a statement may be, the attitude be­
hind it led to sentimentalizing rather than knitting good 
socks. Sentiment was essential, but in war it can not sub­
stitute for adequate and sufficient production. Two pair of 
machine-made socks kept more feet warm than one hand­
made. It was a handicap to become so blinded by emotion­
alism as to fail to strive for the most efficient as well as in­
spired means of serving.
The burst of war enthusiasm and effort and the multiply­
ing of war programs with inadequate planning created a 
mixed situation in which it was often difficult to decide 
whether a particular activity was really accomplishing 
tangible results. Was it also or instead educating and propa­
gandizing citizens on war aims and needs and building up 
a spirit of service and unity ? Or was it merely developing 
and releasing a gush of emotion, which perhaps also ran 
riot in mob violence?
Difficulties in Securing Sustained Work
This question of efficiency was closely linked to a related 
problem—securing sustained effort from citizens. Often 
a program would be launched with enthusiasm and the ac-
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tive help of a large part of the community, but as time 
passed work devolved upon fewer and fewer people.
The conflict between the desire to help or the demands 
for service and actual conduct was very real. Thus a 
speaker at the Des Moines Women’s Club asserted that “any 
club not on a war basis is pro-German.” Yet in the week 
of highest activity for war work, only one-third of the 
club notices mentioned war activities.
The calls for time to sew for the Red Cross, to collect 
food pledge cards, and for similar work probably bore most 
heavily on the majority of women who cared for their 
homes without servants and who had large families. Hie 
news items give the impression that “ society women”  were 
doing most of the work, yet personal reports to us together 
with occasional statements in the press would indicate that 
in fact the “ leisure class” was more important in launching 
and supervising these activities than it was in doing the 
work.
The comments of the society editor were revealing. 
Many times she said in effect, “Social festivities are almost 
at a standstill, society maids and matrons having become 
so interested in war work that social functions are ta­
booed— ” , “women to take no vacation.”  But an inspection 
of the club notices shows less evidence of such single-mind­
ed devotion. Moreover, the society items from the summer 
resorts do not refer to Red Cross sewing or knitting at all 
in 1917 and seldom in 1918. That there was some bad con­
science might be inferred from an extended statement by 
the society editor defending social affairs as healthful in 
times of strain. Many times there were appeals for more 
workers, complaints that Red Cross quotas were overdue 
and that women, “especially women of leisure,” were not 
keeping their work schedules. The undoubted preeminence 
of upper-class women in launching new programs had its 
disadvantages as shown by the apparent meaning of this
news item: “Mrs__________, chairman of the_______ , has
just returned from several weeks sojourn in (a southern 
winter resort) and is issuing a call through the press for 
more volunteers for the motor corps.”
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VACATION TIME?
August 1, 1917 — Courtesy Des Moines Register
Leadership
Leadership always becomes more important in a crisis 
than when affairs are running smoothly. But in wartime 
leaders are lost from the community. Doctors and dentists 
leave for military service; over 800 Iowa physicians served 
in the last war. Other doctors found their time absorbed 
in caring for the patients of doctors who left and in examin­
ing draftees. Ministers, bankers, school teachers and other
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leaders in community life departed to serve in larger enter­
prises. Communities had to get along with less leadership 
or with new leaders.
With the entrance into the community of new organiza­
tions under national and state auspices, new officials, or­
ganizers, speakers and leaders arrived. Some of these new­
comers supplemented the work of local leaders, some re­
placed the local ones. Here was a situation requiring deli­
cate handling, for the status and privileges of the local lead­
ership are likely to be guarded jealously. The centralizing 
tendencies connected with the pressure for urgent action 
ran counter to our traditions of local independence. In so 
far as “outsiders” remained behind the scenes much friction 
was avoided, but when even though it was in appearance 
only they took over the functions of community organizers, 
difficulties were not far off. Organizations and communi­
ties in America cannot be led by fiat or decree; leaders arise 
only on the basis of community confidence. Farmers espec­
ially want leaders whom they know personally as men as 
well as officials or agents. This suspiciousness of outside 
“ efficiency experts” was connected also with some of the 
problems of insuring high standard surgical dressings, as 
well as contests between local “mob rule” and pleas for mod­
eration by central officials.
There was rivalry among local leaders as well as with 
outsiders. In truth, much of the slowness with which war 
work got under way and a large part of the conflicts be­
tween organizations reflected contests for power between 
leaders as much or more than they reflected hostility 
between the ordinary group members. And there was 
jockeying for the key positions in the local coordinating 
groups which supervised the whole community’s war work.
The very novelty of many wartime programs offered 
scope for new talents and ideas, and new persons strove to 
establish themselves as leaders. Nevertheless, few com­
munities tried systematically to discover and utilize poten­
tial new leaders. As a result, existing leaders were much 
overworked, and many campaigns were retarded by the lack 
of executive skill.
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CAMPAIGNS, RALLIES AND CEREMONIES
In March, 1918, the city of Des Moines had 30 different 
campaigns to put across specific war needs. With these 
campaigns came all the rallies, conclaves, demonstrations 
and orations believed to be necessary in putting over drives. 
Des Moines we choose merely as an example. All Iowa 
heard and felt the emotions, the pleas, the martial music of 
campaigns, one crowding close at the heels of another from 
the beginning of the war until its end. (See fig. 3.)
When a new program had to be put across, newspaper ad­
vertisements wouldn’t do, pulpit or classroom announce­
ments were insufficient; the whole paraphenalia of house
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to house visits, seasoned orators, flags, buntings, contests 
and rallies was brought into full play. It was no joke when 
someone in 1918 wrote that “nearly every person in the 
state urged some one else to buy a bond.”
How easy it is to forget with the passing years what 
stores of energy and emotion were expended upon number­
less drives and campaigns to satisfy war needs. Many of 
the most fevered and enthusiastic demonstrations needed 
attachment to no specific campaign program. Rallies 
simply for the sake of rallying, were numerous. Finally, a 
variety of rituals and ceremonies gave dignity and spiritual 
comfort in certain crisis situations which inevitably accom­
pany war.
CAMPAIGNS FOB SPECIFIC PURPOSES
Organization and Time-Pattern of Specific Campaigns
Before 1917 bond buying was not a familiar activity 
among Iowans, but Iowa citizens purchased over $500 mil­
lion of United States Government bonds during the war. 
Five separate campaigns wrought this change, four “Lib­
erty Loan” drives and one Victory Loan after the war. No 
matter how small, most Iowa communities strained to the 
utmost to oversubscribe their quotas in the later cam­
paigns. Iowa got off to a slow start in bond buying, failing 
miserably in the first loan. This was due to a number of 
conditions, but most important were the lack of knowledge 
both of bonds and of the current program, lack of organiza­
tion, and lack of interest. It did not take long for this situ­
ation to change, and in the later loans Iowa went well over 
its mark.
Whenever the new “war community” developed, bond 
sales were promoted by virtually every active organization. 
■Sermons were devoted to their sale, fetes were held to ad­
vertise them, church bells were rung for them, Sousa’s band 
toured them into prominence. In the schools essays were 
written about them, factory owners impelled workmen to 
subscribe, and no holiday passed which was not used to stir 
patriotism for war bonds. Every person, young and old, 
felt the impact of words, music and writing, all insisting 
upon subscription. Almost every public meeting held up
30
Bulletin P, Vol. 2, No. 36 [1942], Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletinp/vol2/iss36/1
247
the necessity. The reluctant customer felt the hostile gaze 
of his community and perhaps the scrutiny of a “ loyalty 
court.” Judging by the number of war news items reported, 
the 2 most active weeks of the war in Iowa were during the 
first and third Liberty Loan campaigns.
Another way these campaigns affected community life 
was in the creation of elaborate organizations to publicize 
the bonds and collect the maximum number of subscrip­
tions. These organizations scheduled the innumerable pub­
lic meetings, invited ministers to preach sermons for them, 
arranged stunts, airplane tours, exhibits and prizes, and 
captained the teams of solicitors as well. State, county, and 
city and precinct committes were placed in charge of soli­
citations.
Closely allied with the sale of bonds was the War Savings 
Stamp campaign. This movement lasted the entire second 
year of the war, but many special drives occurred from time 
to time. One Iowa county had 70 war savings societies. 
Public meetings were held in country school houses and 
community centers, and the cooperation of varieties of or­
ganizations was secured. In this as in the sale of bonds 
each community worked to exceed its quota.
The Red Cross through its vast penetration of community 
organizations also stimulated campaigns of gigantic dimen­
sions. Associated with the creation of new branches were 
drives for general increases of membership. As the first 
membership drive went into June, reaching every Iowa 
county, there were more than 100,000 subscriptions; by 
September there were 200,000. At Christmas a new mem­
bership drive appeared and we find 800,000 Iowans belong­
ing to the Red Cross on January first. By July, 1918, the 
million mark had been passed. Needless to say the citizens 
of every single Iowa community knew that the Red Cross 
campaign had reached their homes. Posters and cards, 
service flags, church sermons, honor rolls, parades all her­
alded the entrance of the membership drives into Iowa com­
munities. “Will you be wearing your Red Cross button 
when the boys come home?” was the question on a million 
lips. “All you need is a heart and a dollar” was shouted 
from a million placards, billboards and pay envelopes.
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But membership was not all that the Red Cross strove 
for. Old clothing drives for refugees in Europe, junk col­
lections, banquets without food, corn husking bees, auctions, 
all were common throughout the state. The Junior Red 
Cross campaigned for clothes, for funds, for gardens and to 
get reading matter for soldiers. Auctions and benefits 
were frequent during the entire war but especially in con­
nection with the first two drives.
The Y.M.C.A., the American Library Association, and 
the Salvation Army were actively campaigning. The Y 
(with the YW) had two major drives during which many 
war-conscious towns held meetings and auctions, each try­
ing to reach its quota early. Many other organizations 
such as the Smokes for Soldiers Club, War Camp Commun­
ity Service, Knights of Columbus, and County Farmers 
Associations conducted separate drives in the course of 
which they enlisted the support of all kinds of groups.
Mainly through the Extension Service of Iowa State Col­
lege innumerable campaigns were conducted toward 
increased production. The scope of these movements may 
be illustrated by the “ September Picking Campaign” to 
gather seed com early. Sixty men reached nearly 40,000 
people personally and distributed 200,000 seed com remind­
er cards and 100,000 information cards. More than 1,400 
demonstrations were held, and every county in the state 
was reached, with striking quantities of seed corn pre­
served. Campaigns to save corn fodder, to increase pork 
production, to stimulate planting of war gardens, to increase 
wheat acreage all impressed themselves upon Iowa farmers 
and were instrumental in putting across the great expan­
sion in production demanded by the war.
From beginning to end the Food Administration be­
sieged the state with campaigns which in their extent 
dwarfed even the Liberty Loan drives. Beginning with a 
program which was not very definite in details, except on 
the production side, the food administration tried strenuous­
ly to bring the reality of the war into every home as a mo­
tive for the conservation of foodstuffs and for controlling 
the production and distribution of food. In many of its 
varied aspects it worked on the drive principle, the formal
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organization being only the starting point for throwing 
communities into action. Like the Red Cross, but with 
even greater official pressure, the Food Administration 
initiated a tremendous publicity campaign through church­
es, lodges, women’s organizations, civic societies, traveling 
men’s organizations, the schools, and, rather ineffectively, 
the moving pictures. As we have shown, the various as­
sociations of farmers, with the Extension Service, were 
successful in enlisting the cooperation of farm people.
A barrage of appeals and regulations appealed to every 
group of citizens, and an increasingly complex system of 
regulations directed the movement of food supplies through 
wholesale and retail channels. We have told how school 
classes and commencement addresses stressed the duty of 
food conservation. The county and state fairs became 
glorified food conservation schools. Four-minute speakers 
sought an audience at every public gathering; in one tour 
of speakers 100,000 Iowans heard the message in 111 
special meetings.
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In the midst of this high-powered publicity drive came 
the first important specific food conservation drive. Al­
though food was a red thread through the whole pattern 
of war activities, th,e Food Pledge campaign, launched in 
the fall of 1917, was the main effort. Women’s groups 
took as their purpose the reaching of every home in Iowa. 
No public gathering was too small to be capitalized upon in 
order to gain pledges. This mass drive shook the public 
into the realization that “ food will win the war.” How 
thorough the campaign was is told by the fact that 91 per­
cent of Iowa’s people signed pledge-cards—as against only 
47 percent for the whole nation.
The Food Administration launched one specific campaign 
after another, though in many cases these lesser drives 
were not well carried through by county administrators. 
Threshermen’s committees checked upon the efficiency of 
machines— enforcing efficiency now and again by extra-le­
gal methods. A whole series of drives were directed toward 
saving particular foodstuffs or scarce substances: sugar, 
wheat and flour, potatoes, fats, garbage, ammonia and ice. 
Excess stocks of flour and wheat were gathered in, potatoes 
substituted for wheat, other wheat substitutes forced into 
use, fish publicized as a substitute for meat, fire prevention 
measures organized, and more efficient routing of grain 
cars arranged. Under the supervision of the Extension 
Service there were campaigns to increase wheat seedings, 
to take a livestock census, to increase honey production, to 
repair farm implements. In all we have counted 26 special 
weeks and campaigns sponsored by the Food Administration 
in addition to the regular duties of actually regulating the 
sale and use of many commodities.
A double-barrelled gardening and canning campaign 
sought to put into practice these pledges to conserve food. 
The drive for gardens was concentrated in the two spring 
seasons. A few schools plowed up playgrounds, some coun­
try clubs gardened where they had golfed, railroads loaned 
the right of way to any users, and many business firms 
loaned or gave garden tools to employees. In some cities 
the vacant lots were card-indexed and plowed at the expense 
of the owner if he was negligent. Then the canning demon-
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strators moved onto the scene to aid all who would preserve 
the plentiful supply of fresh foods. Garden clubs and can­
ning clubs expressed this thrift interest in organizational 
form.
Food Conservation was clearly one of the main themes of 
community service. As for the actual saving of food—the 
controls over distributors and dealers really got results by 
keeping foods out of consumers’ kitchens. The principal 
gain from appeals to consumers was the awakening of near­
ly every household in every community to the realization 
that in the modem world, war means total war. It livened 
the imagination of citizens to the meaning of the war and 
to their obligations in wartime. The need for food con­
servation offered many people their first and most tangible 
opportunity for service and sacrifice.
In this food program we see again very clearly a serious 
type of confusion which cropped up in many places and 
many forms, the confusion between enthusiasm and effici­
ency. Great amounts of time and energy were expended in 
mass meetings and rallies. The indirect effects of these 
upon work by increasing morale were impressive, and it is 
not our purpose to underestimate the utility of these de­
vices for creating and expressing patriotic emotion. Never­
theless, the drain of these meetings upon the participants, 
and particularly upon leaders, raised the serious problem of 
making sure that the enthusiasm produced resulted in 
tangible contribution. This skillfully organized agency, in­
volving countless man hours of work and great cost, was 
described to the public as a movement of direct utility in 
winning the war, and yet the food conservation achieved 
was perhaps of less importance than making people realize a 
war was going on. This indirect contribution of conser­
vation campaigns is clearly stated in the following quotation 
from the state executive secretary in a letter written in 
November 1918.
“To my mind the Food Administration, at least in this 
state, has been the most important bulwark of government 
propaganda, because we have always given the people some­
thing to do. Let the people work at something—and they 
will be fairly happy or at least indisposed toward quarrel-
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ing and fighting. This looks like tossing bouquets at our­
selves but we have reached into every home, have kept ever­
lastingly at it and made the people know that something 
was going on, thus placing them in a receptive mood for 
most anything.”
The ceaseless succession and overlapping of campaigns 
reveal the crusading character of war effort. Sometimes 
so many drives were in progress that some of them had to 
be postponed to permit public attention to be effectively 
focused on the major project.
If space permitted we could continue listing campaigns 
and drives almost without end. There were the compar­
atively small drives such as recruiting campaigns for volun­
teers, drives to enlist the support of bankers in war loans, 
campaigns to collect peach pits for use in gas masks, drives 
to help the Armenians or the Belgians, financial drives for 
the County Councils of National Defense, spontaneous drives 
by multitudes of organizations who in this way would do 
their bit.
Campaigns and the Business Man
Campaigns were specific activities directed at specific in­
dividuals and groups. In order to make this fact concrete 
it may be profitable to look briefly at the effects upon the 
plans and responsibilities of one group in the community. 
The extended discussion just completed on the food cam­
paigns makes it appropriate to use business men for an 
illustration.
Business men throughout the nation were called upon to 
take time from their businesses to assist other citizens in 
promoting campaigns. They were asked to devote store 
space for displays and work rooms for Red Cross sewing. 
Their service was great. But they were impelled by public 
opinion, sometimes beyond their own inclination, to show the 
signs that they had participated and contributed to each of 
the campaigns and drives, that they had bought bonds, 
joined the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., etc. And in many com­
munities some citizens asserted that the business men 
should contribute most since they profited most by rising 
prices. As is true in normal days, the public expected the 
business man to join in every “ worthy cause;” every cam-
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paign was his campaign from the beginning of the war. 
We may suspect that his spirit of charity was dampened 
by his being made “the goat” by citizens for the restrictions 
of consumption and the price rises. That all this cooper­
ation was not entirely happy is evidenced in newspaper re­
ports showing how some industries attempted to evade 
their responsibilities. Just as today, some firms tried to 
avoid accepting government contracts which were less pro­
fitable than private ones. Other indications of the effect 
of complexity of rules, ignorance and cupidity show up in 
the reports of hoarding and particularly profiteering. 
Naturally these offenses increased in number ift 1918 as 
conditions became more stringent and rules multiplied.
Certainly it is true that readjustments were many. Un­
questionably the most important source of difficulty and 
of new conditions of business operation growing out of the 
war were those occasioned by the endless Food Adminis­
tration appeals, codes and decisions. Rules for restaurants, 
rationing of sugar, restriction on size of stocks, profit re­
strictions, all types of regulation necessitated care on the 
part of local business men. Simply an enumeration of the 
different divisions of the Food Administration5 brings home 
the penetration of these regulations into the business life 
of every community. Several different divisions of the 
Food Administration came in contact with individual mer­
chants, often with imprecise or conflicting requests. New 
divisions were continually being set up and each issued new 
rules.
The difficulties of the local business man in many local­
ities were magnified by the frequent failure of county food 
administrators to understand the rules or to bother with 
interpreting them. And in several counties the local ad­
ministration existed on paper only. Good intentions to con­
form to the rules failed of execution sometimes because of 
threats and boycotts by citizens who were more stubborn 
than loyal.
When the dealer did fail to please local opinion, for any
s Divisions of Iowa Food Administration: Sugar, Flour, Merchants, Milk and 
Ice, Hotel and Restaurant, Enforcement, Milling, Education, Propaganda, Bakery, 
Threshing, Perishables, Baker’s Service Committee, Negroes, Movies, Price Inter­
preting, Retail Service, Women’ s Committees, Volunteer’s, College Women Workers, 
Library.
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reason, he received unfavorable publicity, was fined, or had 
his license suspended. Or he might be summoned to judg­
ment by a kangaroo court. Just as farmers’ experience 
did not prepare them to see the need for Liberty Bonds, 
business men were sometimes reluctant or unable to abide 
by the sometimes chaotic controls of the Food Administra­
tion. In any event, the small merchant had hectic days.
The Merging of Campaigns
One can appreciate the volume of these pleas and urgings 
to which citizens were subjected by looking at fig. 3 which 
sums up all campaign items.6 There were two high peaks 
in the springs, two lesser peaks in the falls, slumps in each 
summer, and a minor drop during winter. In contrast to 
the whole pattern of activities of all types (fig. 1), 1918 
was not a more active campaign year than 1917.
One reason for the failure of 1918 to exceed 1917 in cam­
paign activity was the merging of efforts. Citizens and 
leaders alike realized that too much time and energy were 
going into the successive drives, each of which required ex­
tensive planning and proved an unfair burden on the lim­
ited number of experienced leaders. At first informally, 
late in 1917, two or more campaigning organizations com­
bined efforts. Several counties and many communities 
formed Service Leagues, War Chests, or Welfare Bureaus to 
cut down the number of calls for money and to simplify and 
coordinate other types of public appeals. Late in 1918 on a 
national scale the seven principal welfare agencies finally 
merged into the United War Work Campaign, but the war 
was over before their drive was launched.
Increasing Pressure to Contribute
The sincerity of public response to the many appeals for 
money and service is unquestioned. The flowering of 
rallies at the beginning of the war proves this. So does the 
huge sum of money contributed over the whole period of 
the war. Nevertheless, giving became more and more of a 
burden. The need for making sure that no one was avoid-
e This picture Is not really complete, since news Items referring to campaigns 
were sometimes grouped under rallies or meetings. But the picture is accurate so 
far as concerns the time fluctuations.
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ing his responsibility and that every community came up 
to its quota soon led to new plans for handling campaigns. 
The changes in attitudes connected with the new arrange­
ments will be discussed later, but one reason has already 
been pointed out—the necessity to spend less time and 
energy in campaigning.
Voluntary giving became “ taxation” giving. At first 
war funds were raised just like any charity funds, by ask­
ing people to give. Some did and some did not, and each 
gave what he wished. The next step was to insist that 
everyone give something. Then a quota was assigned each 
person, and he was asked to please give this amount. 
Finally, unofficial taxation unfolded in complete detail; 
everyone had a quota and he had to give that amount or 
prove that his quota was unfair. Slowness or refusal to 
meet his quota frequently resulted in a summons to a 
“ slacker court” and the assessment of a “fine” in addition 
to the quota. This taxation caused much resentment and 
was the source of much community conflict, but it was a 
logical development of the wartime needs for huge funds 
for many purposes.
RALLIES, MASS MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
War is group action. Modern war requires everyone to 
work for victory. In such a collective crisis people experi­
ence strong emotions. They come together to express their 
determination, to show their loyalty to the cause, and to 
calm their fears. From an emotional standpoint these as­
semblages were probably the high points of most individ­
uals’ wartime experiences.
There were two general types of these meetings. One 
occurred as a direct means to the successful carrying on of 
some specific campaign or program. Major examples of 
this type were Red Cross rallies or Liberty Loan rallies. 
The other type had a less specific focus and mainly served 
to affirm community loyalty, support of the soldiers, re­
sentment at disloyalty, or “ to let off steam.”
Campaign Rallies
Naturally the first type of rallies occurred along with 
campaigns for the most part. The second, more general
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rallies were sporadic in occurrence, with considerable con­
centration at the beginning of the war before communities 
had learned specific ways to contribute to the war pro­
grams. The pattern of these rallies lacked the seasonal 
fluctuations previously observed in campaigns (fig 3), Red 
Cross activities (fig. 2), or all activities (fig. 1).
Every community participated in numerous mass meet­
ings, parades, or demonstrations in which enthusiasm was 
stirred for particular war enterprises. In almost every 
county women’s organizations had a patriotic meetings com­
mittee in which thousands of Iowa women were reached by 
speakers for each of the various campaigns. In many coun­
ties food conservation meetings were held in every school 
house. Parades were common with the campaigns, and 
auctions appealed particularly to the rural population as a 
means of raising money. In each of the drives we find 
organizations reaching out to thousands through mass 
meetings of all types. In addition to the assemblages 
brought together by the plans of campaign committees, 
audiences nominally assembled for a variety of purposes 
were turned into enthusiastic campaign crowds. Thus a 
full thousand 4-minute speakers roused Iowa’s movie audi­
ences, church congregations, school assemblies; chautau- 
quas drew people bent upon entertainment and enthused 
them for the Red Cross and Food Conservation. People 
not only belonged to the new organizations, financed them 
and attended their meetings, but they also gathered with 
fellow citizens en masse to cheer their work and hear of 
their progress. During a single Liberty Loan campaign in 
Sioux City, for example, 122 audiences totaling over 42,000 
listeners were brought together. In Keokuk County one 
man made 200 war speeches and addresses. In many com­
munities a relic train (equipped with war weapons) drew 
thousands of patriotic spectators who were addressed by a 
corps of most effective speakers. Every holiday festival 
became the scene for campaign promotion, and holiday fes­
tivals themselves became more widely celebrated than ever 
before.
Few weeks passed in which there was no mass meeting
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of campaigners reported, although in general long periods 
of comparative inactivity were broken by weeks having 
great numbers of meetings. During summer months both 
in 1917 and 1918 campaign meetings were at the lowest ebb, 
following the great enthusiasm of early spring.
General Demonstrations
Most of these mass meetings and demonstrations were 
obviously a part of what we have described as “ campaign­
ing,” but in fact these formed only a part of the enthusiastic 
get-togethers inspired by the war spirit.
There were large numbers of general patriotic rallies and 
demonstrations, not to further any campaign but simply to 
express patriotic emotion and enthusiasm. The early weeks 
of the war constituted a period of tremendous diffuse en­
thusiasm, unequalled in later months. In the first month 
of the war about 55 such demonstrations were reported. 
Not again during the course of the war did any month 
compare to this, and from June, 1917, until February, 1918, 
less than 20 were reported.
Much the same situation existed for parades, which ap­
peared with some frequency in the early stages of the war 
but rapidly dropped from sight until near the end. The 
irregular appearance of these rallies is notable. Following 
the great surge of patriotism in the early weeks of the war 
very few demonstrations were reported until 1918. In 
1918 rallies occurred at odd intervals, but they did not reach 
the same heights as just after the declaration.
As the war progressed virtually every Iowa community 
had send-off parades, banquets and mass meetings when the 
boys left for camp. These were not half-hearted affairs. 
Businesses closed, towns of a few hundred persons had liter­
ally thousands of individuals lining the streets and crammed 
into halls, listening to patriotic music and addresses dedi­
cated to the departing soldiers and stimulating patriotic 
emotions in the hearts of youth not yet called. In about 
the first month of the war over 20 “ send-offs” of volunteers 
were reported, probably a small fraction of the total num­
ber held. Following this early enthusiasm it was not until 
the spring of 1918 that farewells enjoyed a strong revival
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(except for the first registration week Sept. 2, 1917); in 
July, 1918, nearly 30 were reported in a single week.
These demonstrations had no direct utilitarian purpose. 
They were devoted wholeheartedly to expressing and arous­
ing patriotic sentiments. As we have seen, it was no small 
part of the purpose of specific campaign rallies to inspire 
patriotism and sentiment as well as to attain specific pur­
poses. But demonstrations were primarily “ sentiment 
stimulators.”
In addition to community-wide rallies and patriotic meet­
ings, there were in every community numerous patriotic 
programs by and for groups smaller than the community 
itself. Churches, lodges, women’s drill clubs, public schools 
and a host of others put on their own private rallies and 
pageants.
We have now added another group of activities to the 
filling picture of community effort. It becomes even more 
evident how widely these activities ramified throughout 
the community. There was sufficient opportunity for 
everyone to serve, sacrifice, or save for the welfare of the 
nation.
One who reviews the chronicle of the last war will in­
quire how much activity was justified, the only aim of 
which was to raise morale and produce patriotic sentiments ? 
At first thought one might say that any amount of activity 
was justified if it united us in action, but is such an answer 
complete? In the last war huge sums were expended and 
much labor used simply to bring the war home to the people. 
This was a necessary task. Yet there was a difference be­
tween time and money expended directly in winning the 
war and money or time spent indirectly enthusing people 
to the work. Thus we have seen that the food pledge cam­
paign of World War I consumed energy in making people 
war conscious and offering to all the belief that they were 
contributing. But may we ask if other programs might 
not have been substituted which would still have brought 
the war home to the community and have provided more 
tangible services directly toward the war effort? Certain­
ly the same question should be faced in reference to the 
more emotional demonstrations without specific and tangi-
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ble purpose. Time and energy are scarce commodities. In 
wartime they are worth budgeting. The fundamental 
problem is, cannot morale be built upon productive enthu­
siasm as well as upon random enthusiasm?
CEREMONIES, RITUALS AND SYMBOLS
The tense fervent emotions of wartime gave patriotic 
holidays new and greater significance, and they were ob­
served in greater number and with more warmth of feeling. 
In addition to Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Flag Day, 
Lincoln’s and Washington’s birthdays, new days were add­
ed: Pershing’s birthday, Liberty Day, Thrift Day. All 
were made occasions for affirming the purposes of the war, 
the sense of unity with the whole nation and its allies. 
They recalled the past achievements of the community and 
the nation. Their solemnity spiritualized the war efforts 
and dulled the weariness and heartache of the conflict. 
Common performance of patriotic rituals helped to calm 
feuds and bitterness where any existed within the com­
munity.
Group gatherings of all kinds, by their emotional 
heightening and the seriousness of their occasioning, be­
came ceremonials. Every big campaign was launched with 
fetes or a parade. National days, as Flag Day or Columbus 
Day, were chosen to open or close drives. Band concerts 
were more frequent. In short, activities and their purposes 
received emphasis and greater significance through becom­
ing community ceremonies.
Symbols are the focal points of ceremonies or rituals 
and reminders of collective emotions. During the war 
traditional symbols were “polished up”  and new ones cre­
ated. The national flag received more reverence, and Iowa 
adopted a state flag. Irreverent treatment of the flag, 
which in peacetime might be dismissed with a warning, be­
came a major offense. Symbols were taking on greater 
meaning, and reverence to them became a touchstone of 
loyalty. Being forced to kiss the flag was not an uncommon 
penalty for many real or imagined acts of disloyalty. The 
growing use of the flag as a rallying point for collective 
sentiment was evidenced in the numerous presentations of
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flags to communities by loyal groups and by the phenomenal 
increase in the sale of flags. During a period of a week or 
two in April, 1917, 25,000 flags were sold in Waterloo alone, 
and the merchants in many towns could not meet the de­
mand.
The national anthem shared this new status. No longer 
was its singing reserved for a few holidays. It became an 
ever present influence* awakening people to their bond of 
citizenship. Very early it was decreed that every school 
should open each day’s work with the Star Spangled Ban­
ner. At the same time as the singing of the national an­
them became a ritual, the singing of German songs became 
taboo.
Patriotic monuments, especially memorials to veterans of 
previous wars, became community shrines to be visited in 
ceremonial fashion on days of determination as well as on 
the one day of remembrance. By association with the sen­
timents of Memorial Day the flags of North and South be­
came joint national symbols.
Other new symbols were created. Communities set up 
scoreboards to mark their progress in selling bonds, re­
cruiting members for the Red Cross, collecting junk, or 
making bandages. Even the “ slacker monuments” bearing 
the names of families accused of disloyalty were, by re­
verse symbolism, marks of pride to the other members of 
the community. Those communities which were unusually 
successful in various campaigns won honor flags.
Even the humblest citizen, when in uniform, could repre­
sent the whole community to itself. Returned wounded 
soldiers impressed the folks at home with the need for re­
newed effort and greater sacrifice. Welcoming these men 
home became a new ceremonial occasion.
Public leaders received greater deference as political 
party lines were minimized. Demands for loyalty led to 
many charges of making statements derogatory to the pres­
ident, the army, or our Allies.
Enjoying reflected prestige from its association with the 
national emblem, the service flag also stood high in its own 
right within the group of patriotic symbols. Soon after 
men began leaving their homes in large numbers the service
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flag began to appear in homes, churches, businesses and 
schools. A star for every soldier, with other symbols for 
nurses and welfare workers, symbolized the bodily sharing 
of that family or group in the dangers of war. These flags 
were dedicated with all the pageantry of religion and pat­
riotism. Their poignancy increased as blue stars became 
gold, and as the casualty lists lengthened, memorial services 
became an increasingly important ritual of community life. 
The role of such ceremonies in softening the bereavement 
of families can hardly be overestimated.
Finally, among the symbols and ritual acts should be in­
cluded the insistence upon the use of English and resent­
ment at any use of foreign speech. The common traditional 
language was inevitably affirmed as a necessity for loyalty. 
Not merely German, but also the language of our ‘‘foreign 
speaking” Allies was tabooed. Communities with names 
like “ Berlin”  or “Little Germany” changed overnight into 
“Lincolns”  or “Liberty Corners.”  Families of “Stager- 
walds and Petzelhoffers became “Stags” and “Huffs.”
No one could deny that these rituals were of profound 
importance in building community and national spirit; and 
it would involve many pages to complete the list of slogans, 
signs, songs and symbols which emerged—all focusing upon 
national unity and awakening pride in our country’s achieve­
ments and honor. Not all of these symbols, however, stim­
ulated unity through pride of country; some of them turned 
upon hatred of our enemies. The pictures of tortured 
children became symbols of a German mentality and served 
to unify us by hate just as the glorious symbols of America 
unified us in love and sacrifice. All these symbols and slo­
gans stirring our emotions of pride, fear, hatred and loyalty 
combined with the unceasing campaigns and the huge ral­
lies to bring out the contributions upon which winning the 
war so closely depended.
ATTITUDES AND SENTIMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY 
IN WARTIME
No people, however Spartan, could be expected to send 
their sons to battlefields, their daughters to distant factor­
ies, their life savings into armaments with utter coolness,
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without tinges of regret, fear, and perhaps hate. War sit­
uations are inevitably emotional because they reach into 
those basic spheres of our lives and our community rela­
tions which are the dearest and about which we center our 
strongest hopes. Behind and within external affairs, as 
well as growing out of the community events, were atti­
tudes and sentiments. Moreover, many of the regretted 
happenings of wartime, as persecution of “ pro-,Germans,” 
arose from confusion of attitudes with objective actions. 
We must understand both of these sides of life, the external 
and the internal, if we would understand the community in 
wartime and profit from the lessons of 1917-18.
THE FOCUS OF ATTITUDES AND ATTENTION UPON THE W AR
To say that all attention turned to war, threatened or 
actual, seems too obvious perhaps to mention. Its impor­
tance, however, warrants description in abundant detail. 
This shift of focus occurred slowly and had been underway 
during the pre-war period of tension. Only gradually did 
people realize how pervasive the war’s effects could be, how 
comprehensive the changes in daily life must be. The war- 
orientation of thought and feeling went on more quickly in 
some groups or communities or spheres of living than in 
others. But the dominant motive of “win the war” became 
the measure for judging private lives, public programs and 
all activities in the community.
The readjustment of attitudes and ideals took place both 
individually and collectively. Individuals reflected on wheth­
er they or some member of their family must join the army, 
whether their business might profit or suffer, whether 
they should still plan to marry, how to adjust their 
peaceful religious or ethical standards to approve or toler­
ate war, what topics of conversation could be pursued with­
out alienating or grieving friends, and how to show suffi­
cient patriotism.
Every group also re-evaluated its goals and activities in 
the light of new demands, as we have shown. That all 
these reflections and attitudes did not exist in a vacuum 
should be sufficiently evident from the facts already dis­
cussed.
Gradually the feeling of being hypnotized by the magni-
46
Bulletin P, Vol. 2, No. 36 [1942], Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletinp/vol2/iss36/1
263
tude and significance of the war separated into many parti­
cular objects of attention and into a corresponding complex­
ity of attitudes.
THE SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE
One of the most clear-cut attitudes focused upon “the 
spirit of sacrifice.”  While in normal times people were not 
lacking in a social sense or civic responsibility, nonetheless 
it was accepted as proper that each family lived for its own 
ends for the most part. In war they were forced and also 
willingly admitted the need for sacrifice. In varying de­
grees people renounced private indulgences and conceded 
the necessity of giving up anything required to win the war. 
Not all saw this urgency equally clearly or as quickly as 
others. Some tried to evade the responsibility society im­
posed. This variation in quickness of response frequently 
created a tendency to be more critical of others’ sacrifices 
than of one’s own. Of course this submergence of individ­
ual and personal goals to public necessity did not come, as 
is sometimes supposed, automatically with the declaration 
of war. It came by dint of building, by participating in 
rallies and campaigns, and out of the very sacrifices and 
services themselves.
The Federal Government and, in turn, the separate com­
munities invented ways to equalize sacrifice and to convince 
each person that all were sharing the privations. Among 
the methods of demonstrations used were publication of re­
tail and wholesale prices, so that consumers could see that 
their grocers were not profiteering, and the use of quotas 
limiting the amount of sugar or white flour anyone could 
buy.
Sacrifices generally reflected an attitude of almost light­
hearted generosity and willingness. “ In a small county 
neighborhood in Linn County a Red Cross auction was in 
process when the auctioneer, pausing at the end of a ‘knock­
down’ happened to glance upward and see a flock of wild 
ducks flying overhead. Before the ducks were out of sight 
they had been sold for $345. [The Red Cross] stated its 
expectation of hearing that clouds and square yards of blue 
sky were being sold for the Red Cross in Iowa.”  But as 
campaign followed campaign many communities felt at-
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titudes of “obligation” or fear of public opinion or otner 
more somber moods coming into view. The evolution of 
the spirit of sacrifice into a demand that sacrifice be uni­
versal and equal (relative to ability to contribute) was well 
illustrated by the shift in giving to the Welfare Campaigns 
or subscribing to Liberty Loans from a haphazard, volun­
tary basis to one resembling compulsory taxation.
“Taxation giving” with its quotas, assessments, “ slacker 
courts” and the publicity devices such as Red Cross 100 per­
cent flags were expressions of the determination to be sure 
everyone gave, and to assure everyone that his neighbors 
also had “done their bit.”  This plan achieved its purpose 
in general, though many resented the compulsion and the 
undermining of the generosity motive. How to equate 
families having sons in the army with those not so directly 
touched by war demands was a serious problem.
But all the sincere efforts to set the demands at a level 
fair to each group in society did not prevent some inequali­
ties in effect, however equal quotas might appear on paper. 
In part the trouble was that the minimum limits of giving 
were set too high. The requirement, which was apparently 
general, that every family buy at least one $50 bond im­
posed a disproportionate burden on the majority of laborers 
whose incomes were being depleted by rising prices faster 
than they grew from wage increases. Even when these 
subscriptions were wholly voluntary, they were frequently 
too heavy. In addition the small subscriptions to the Red 
Cross or benefits of various kinds made the total still larger. 
Finally, the Victory Boy and Girl organizations and the 
War Savings Stamp assessments on children were an acute 
embarrassment to large numbers of children and families. 
The reports of charity societies reiterate the plea to relax 
these drafts on low incomes, since they forced welfare 
agencies to increase family allotments, as well as forcing 
families onto relief.
There was remarkedly little complaint over the inequali­
ties, although the rising level of demands as war continued 
did push some people close to the point of rebellion. This 
feeling came to the surface in the fifth or Victory Loan 
drive in 1919.
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“ In this (fifth) campaign the excuse, ‘I have already done 
my share and more in the first four loans/ was frequently 
heard. . . Solicitors more frequently encountered such ex­
cuses as, ‘Let the rich buy the bonds, they are the ones who 
have profited by the war; the wage earners^and the poor 
have been the chief sufferers in this war.. .  !”
But in general the desire and the necessity to serve con­
verged in a tremendous effort of public devotion and ser­
vice. The very omnipresence of service gave new signifi­
cance and savor to innumerable details of daily life. Those 
spheres of privacy untouched also became more relished. 
Food habits, recreation, school attendance, temperance, pre­
servation of health, criticism or loyalty to fellow citizens- 
all were defended on the basis of helping win the war.
INSISTENCE UPON UNANIMITY
It can be clearly seen that not merely did individuals or 
communities quite generally devote loyalty, time, energy 
and money to the war; they also insisted that all must af­
firm and demonstrate enthusiasm for national purposes. 
Disloyalty in deed, work, or suspected attitude was forbid­
den. Passive support, resigned participation, or quiet ser­
vice was not enough. Outspoken assertions of faith, unin­
hibited enthusiasm and ostracism of any who seemed luke­
warm were expected also.
Even when there was wholehearted agreement on war 
aims and pledged faith in the nation’s leaders, it took cour­
age to disagree honestly on the best means to use in reach­
ing the agreed-upon goals. The need for ingenuity in ef­
ficient work and for original plans for community organiza­
tion was often forgotten amidst the clamor for unity.
The decision to fight had crystallized public opinion in 
a rigid pattern. And the anxieties of wartime tolerated 
little quibbling or hesitating. As war emotion rose, the 
demand increased for a common front. And from intoler­
ance arose propaganda, coercion and persecution as well as
unity in feeling and striving.
The cries of loyalty sometimes became shrill. There were 
demands for punishment of reluctant givers or for making 
an example of those who spoke German or perhaps  ^voiced 
their suspicions that some welfare agency was inefficiently
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managed. One Iowa official demanded a 20-year prison 
term for anyone not supporting the war program. These 
lusty cries for vengeance or heated protestations of pa­
triotism sometimes reached such a pitch that they were 
hysterical.
DISLOYALTY
The Time-Pattern of Disloyalty
We have given the impression in our narration up to this 
point, that community solidarity increased with the in­
crease in war work. But it would not be correct to assume 
that in loyal Iowa communities there were no conflicts of 
wills and beliefs.
While there were relatively few actual cases of genuine 
disloyalty, the accusations were legion. Many such charges 
grew out of spite feuds, misunderstood remarks by persons 
of German descent, and carping criticims by temperamental 
rebels who in deed if not in word were wholly loyal.
The conflicts of individuals and minority groups with 
their communities were shown in two principal ways: (1) 
by symbolic acts affronting the honor of national symbols, 
such as flags, or insults to leaders; and (2) by actions or in­
ertia not consistent with what the community expected as 
full cooperation in war programs.
While the symbolic acts were dramatic and linger in our 
minds, these were relatively few in Iowa. We have, of 
course, numerous accounts of German sympathisers tearing 
down flags7 or failing to stand to the national anthem, but 
most of these occurred soon after war was declared, and 
comparatively few such cases arose later in the war period. 
External conformity came rather quickly. Verbal insults 
included not only such statements as “wishing the president 
were dead”  and jokes about the appearance of parading 
troops but also any criticisms of leaders or policies which 
were resented by the community. These offenses occurred 
rather steadily throughout the war.
Opposition to the war or to the draft was a type of of­
fense sometimes consisting only of grumblings, at other
i  A  sidelight on this attitude toward flags is to he found in the complaint in 
one city several months after the war began that m ost o f  the flags visible around 
town were tattered and neglected.
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times actual speeches or organized criticism. This kind of 
disloyalty also was a persistent event over the whole period. 
The few desertions and individual draft evaders are not in­
cluded in the data.
Spy cases were negligible in number in Iowa, as were 
cases of sabotage. But open pro-Germanism, organizing 
meetings to support Germany or to help persons loyal to 
Germany, were reported almost every week. Most of the 
accusations were probably false, but some outspoken ex­
pressions of unwillingness to help America fight Germany 
did occur. Significantly, these more direct cases (or 
charges) of aid to the enemy increased after the first surge 
of rallies at the opening of the war and after the early 
campaigns of 1918. This problem was certainly of no less 
magnitude in 1918 than in 1917.
More serious than insults or open sympathy with the 
enemy, if we may measure seriousness by frequency of 
newspaper items, were conflicting sentiments over partici­
pation in various patriotic programs. Those persons who 
failed to buy their share of Liberty Bonds, those who did 
not join the Red Cross, those who hoarded sugar or flour, 
and the profiteers were the people who brought forth most 
of the bitter accusations in Iowa. No one can say how 
many of these disloyal acts were disloyal in intent and how 
many were due to ignorance or were merely selfish. It is 
noteworthy that these kinds of offenses were almost lack­
ing in 1917 but increased in 1918.
The enforcement division of the Iowa Food Administra­
tion handled about 2,000 cases, but in only 500 cases were 
the offenders found at fault. In addition many hundreds, 
probably thousands, of other violations or accusations were 
disposed of at the county level. How frequently personal 
grudges, or jealous competitors, rather than bonafide mis­
deeds brought public censure upon the heads of innocents 
no one can ever know. But we do know that the mere sug­
gestion of disloyalty could be a dangerous weapon in a war­
conscious community.
Not only offenses against the numerous food regulations 
but also refusals to contribute to national campaigns be­
came greater in number—or at least people become more
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conscious of them—as the war progressed. During the 
first 6 months of the war, only one refusal to give in a 
campaign was reported; in the second 6 months the number 
increased to more than 50, and in the final 7 months there 
were about 125 cases reported. While these reports are 
in no sense complete enumerations, they certainly indicate 
no complete unanimity as the war progressed. In part at 
least the increase in refusals to contribute reflected the 
heightened demand for more contributions. The wider 
adoption of forced contributions certainly produced some of 
this increase. More refusals might well have been expect­
ed as the drives reached more and more people. This does 
not account entirely for the increasing number of refusals, 
since the last month of the war did not have an outstanding 
number of campaigns, yet it had the largest number of 
refusals to contribute. Even though total contributions 
grew tremendously as the war progressed, dissatisfaction 
and refusal to sacrifice also became more evident, or at 
least became increasingly serious in the eyes of most citi­
zens so as to warrant increasing publicity.
Suppression of Disloyalty
Sedition cases increased with the passing of time. But 
anti-sedition activities remained at about the same level in 
both years. Disloyal acts were met by defensive acts by 
citizens and officials. Sometimes, however, the fear of dis­
loyalty led to loyalty crusades and to accusations of dis­
loyalty. In August, 1917, for example, a United States 
marshall visited 20 towns and issued mass warnings to the 
citizens.
Publicity, with fear of public opinion, was the chief weap­
on for insuring conformity among the wavering, and for en­
forcing regulations. This fact evidenced the strength of 
public sentiment. The mere possibility of having one’s 
business ruined or one’s children mistreated was a real check 
to some who honestly believed they knew a better policy as 
well as to the outright pro-Germans.
The destruction of German books and the prohibition of 
the use of German in public or its teaching in the schools 
were widely regarded as essential to national unity and ef-
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fective prosecution of the war. Yet it is surprising to not­
ice that these three defensive policies were not used to any 
great extent before 1918 with the partial exception of dis­
approval of the use of German in public. This taboo on 
foreign languages worked much hardship on older people 
who had learned no English and on church congregations 
whose pastors could not preach in English. Many parochial 
schools were closed by necessity or as a precaution. There 
were occasional purgings of school and public libraries.
The minute-man tradition of an American citizen militia 
expressed itself in the organization of men’s drill corps 
which were frequently used to patrol towns, protecting them 
from sabotage. At irregular intervals local home guards 
were organized to replace the militia called into federal ser­
vice. Women in some communities also organized in mili­
tary companies, probably more as a gesture.
Sentiment and public opinion were sufficiently powerful 
in most communities to bring into line nearly all the per­
sons who were disloyal in feeling as well as those who did 
not serve or sacrifice as generously as the community de­
sired. But wartime emotion was impatient. Not every 
community relied on neighborhood gossip to check up on 
the loyalty of citizens. In one city the Liberty Riders were 
a self-appointed secret group to spy out the seditious. All 
were warned in these terms: “The Liberty Riders are 
scattered in all parts of the city. Your next door neighbor 
might be one.” Such procedures for dealing with the prob­
lem hardly conformed to the American standards of legality 
and freedom of speech.
Feeling was sufficiently strong in many communities to 
cause extra-legal “ courts” to be set up and their decisions 
carried out on those found guilty of not doing their share— 
or what the “ court” decided should be their share. In 
some communities wise leaders foresaw the problems and 
established the courts or service appeal boards deliberately 
to head off mob action. There were numerous genuinely 
heroic acts by conscientious leaders trying to preserve 
democratic ways of acting. Where these courts were well 
planned and fairly administered few citizens long resented 
the decisions rendered, and irresponsible mob action was
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prevented. In other communities local tyrants or overly 
zealous patriots operated their ‘‘courts” in less humane 
fashion and created community factions which are reported 
to persist today as obstacles to public cooperation. That 
some of these “ courts” departed far from the rules of just­
ice is indicated by the story of a county bar association re­
solving to defend no one accused of sedition. Communities 
became more sensitive to the presence of non-cooperators 
as the war continued.
The operation of these “courts” was closely linked to the 
development of compulsory donation, which has been de­
scribed already. Many communities set up card files of all 
residents in which were recorded each individual’s wealth, 
income, previous donations and current quota. If anyone 
refused to give, his name was entered on a pink card, and 
he received a summons "to the “ court.”  By contrast, a re­
ported 20,000 income tax evaders received scant attention.
Houses were painted yellow to warn their owners to be 
more patriotic. Stores were treated similarly. Flags were 
nailed to suspected homes or churches. A few houses and 
barns and at least one church were burned as extreme marks 
of community displeasure. Men were doused with yellow 
paint.8 A few ministers of the gospel were forbidden to 
leave their homes or to preach without the express permis­
sion of the local defense committee.
The publishing of names of non-contributors and the 
building of “slacker monuments”—yellow obelisks with the 
names of the disloyal—in the town square were more con­
crete expressions of the determination to enforce the com­
munity’s will on all. More such terroristic incidents would
111 m  ( g  H i
city) jeered; school children forced Lutoeran ir e a S e r  
to salute flag ; high school teacher’s body painted vellow P  e^ c ^r
buy Savings Stamps; attorney convicted under espionaet* art hoMi e 
the United States would be L tte r  o ff if trow s h ^  W n  Lr?t P r t  he stated 
teacher fired because he could not buy bonds; ^ s tm a s te r ’ s hous<f in * home:_ FT®* 
yellow; Civil W ar veteran ejected and d is m is s ^  f r ^  for S H i i
county sheriff unable to purcase another bond and dismissed from 
woman jailed for saying the government could not have hwfnnrt 5 ° ™ ,  p J ^ ard:M M  h m m W pi»
I b m b m  «<*imm h i  m
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have occurred but for diligent work by level-headed peace 
officials. In times of crisis, however, these problems usual­
ly were solved at the local level with whatever resources of 
leadership and objectivity were available there.
These direct procedures were defended by one outstand­
ing patriot in these terms:
“ . . . . the American people have a power—a God-given 
power, a power higher and greater than the Consitution or 
law, the power from which the law derives its being, and 
the patriotic people of America have the courage to exer­
cise that power to save the government, to save the Flag, 
and to save the law itself from destruction at home as well 
as abroad.”
Such sentiments, as most citizens decided in later and 
calmer years, were exactly the terms always used to justify 
lynch-law— even if few people in 1917 would have approved 
using such extreme measures with less patriotic fellow citi­
zens. But the widespread approval at the time of similar 
feelings and the frequent occurrence of illegal treatment 
of slackers does show how formidable a problem responsible 
leaders faced. Many leaders recognized quite clearly that 
the preservation of the things we were fighting for depend­
ed upon moderation and the preservation of respect for 
judicial procedures.®
As the numerous county councils of defense became 
organized they tended to take over this policing function. 
Wider use of the county council, card index files and 
“ courts” all were parts of an increasingly efficient and cen­
tralized local organization for civilian war work.
OTHER TYPES OF EMOTIONALISM
Still another characteristic result of emotionalism in 
World War I was increased suggestibility. In those times 
of tension rumors spread like fire, people wanted to know 
something definite, to believe something specific, instead 
of waiting upon the course of events. Rumor and even 
panic could spread with great rapidity. In part this type 
of mentality was purposely created in the last war “ thus
» Some readers m ay wish to argue that the Instances of irresponsible mob action 
which occurred during the war were merely temporary flare-ups with no long-run 
Aside from their Importance In themselves, these wartime actious 
probably were not unrelated to the K u Klux Klan episodes In the early 20’s.
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placing them in a receptive mood for most anything,” in 
part it was a product of the waiting and the tenison itself, 
for the people back home had to struggle with their hopes 
and fears as the soldiers battled in physical combat. Thus 
in Iowa the rumor that draft numbers had been chosen (a 
rumor abroad sometime before the lottery occurred) 
brought within a space of minutes great crowds on the 
streets of Des Moines. From the moment the rumor origi­
nated it spread through the city and through the state as 
fast as the modern radio could have carried the word. 
People wanted to stop waiting—because they wanted to 
know, they believed too easily.
Many citizens sincerely believed that most of the severe 
fires were set by enemy agents and that doctors were inocu­
lating soldiers with flu germs. Woman after woman re­
ported finding ground glass in canned food. The fact that 
chemists proved the ground glass was only sugar or salt 
did not keep the rumor from springing up again and again. 
Itinerant peddlars were arrested for selling “poisoned” 
medicine. The atmosphere of war bred suspicion, supersti­
tion and legend, and a significant part of leaders’ time was 
devoted to persuading people to return to calmer paths of 
steady work and saner thinking.
This problem of leadership in the sphere of sentiment 
was indeed large. To fight modem wars requires the cul­
tivation of fervent patriotism and—some would argue— 
even hatred of the enemy. But when these strong emotions 
“ spill over” they create community feuds, and they are dis­
torted into persecution of innocent citizens. They lead to 
innumerable distractions from the real tasks of war activity. 
This situation also gives license to irresponsible persons to 
start attacks on disliked officials, group leaders or neigh­
bors. The very emotionalism of war festers many existing 
points of tension in community life and prevents whole­
hearted cooperation.
The programs of German hatred launched in many com­
munities through atrocity stories, cartoons and “photo­
graphs” held implications unseen by their promoters. 
Hatred may inspire winning armies, but it also inspires de­
mands for retribution at the cost of world order.
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THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY
Increasing community solidarity was not an accident but 
an achievement. There were serious obstacles in Iowa to 
obtaining the kind of results demanded by modem war. 
Iowa had a large German population, some of whom were 
not sympathetic to the war. The state was located far from 
the East with its ties to Europe and its alarms of attack 
from the sea. It also had a scattered, rural population un­
accustomed to campaigns and centralized organization. 
And farmers by long tradition viewed bonds as poor in­
vestments.
There is no way of testing whether more or fewer peo­
ple disliked the war and all it involved as time passed, or 
whether the average degree of loyalty increased or de­
creased. The growing number of violations of food regula­
tions might indicate either less loyalty or the increased 
number of regulations and a greater determination to en­
force them evenly. The increase in accusations of disloyal 
acts of many kinds was probably in large part a reflection 
of the rising temper of opinion. More refusals to contribute 
to campaigns surely reflected higher quotas and better 
organization for soliciting everyone at least as much as they 
reflected greater reluctance. In short, community opinion 
was becoming strong enough to overwhelm those who would 
object.
New organizations and more work done by more organi­
zations as described earlier are evidence of the Iowa com­
munity’s growing results. If we take a measure of accom­
plishment the things Iowans could best do by training and 
situation, there certainly was a great increase in food pro­
duction and at least some in food conservation. The Ex­
tension Service did notable work in bringing Iowa farmers 
to reach the high production goals set by the Food Admin­
istration. In spite of the fact that 50,000 farm men were 
called for military service, farm production was increased a 
full 25 percent above preceding years. It is estimated that 
home demonstration agents led to the canning of more than 
15 million additional quarts of fruit and vegetables.
If the test of solidarity was results, then the rising total 
of campaign subscriptions showed that Iowa communities
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were learning to work together to help win the war. Only 
60,000 Iowans bought bonds of the first loan, but state 
pride and better organization enrolled 288,000 subscribers 
to the second, and 660,000 for the third loan. For the 
fourth 648,000 persons subscribed. Out of 99 counties, 
only 12 reached their quotas in the first drive, 48 in the 
second, 99 in the third, but only 87 in the fourth. Increases 
of four- and five-fold in the amounts subscribed were not 
unusual between early and later drives. One county raised 
12 percent of its quota in the first, 26 percent in the second, 
and 412 percent in the third loan drive. The failures in 
early campaigns often gave the needed incentive for achiev­
ing the needed intensification and coordination of effort.
In countless other ways the rising tide of community 
spirit and loyalty were evidenced. Iowa communities vied 
for the honor of sending the most recruits to the services, 
they disputed over the number of gardens their citizens 
maintained and over successes in various war campaigns. 
Indictment of a community as disloyal brought forth strong 
assertions of its united patriotism. Community pride took 
on new importance.
But this sensitiveness to disloyalty had the effect also of 
suppressing originality. When in a war situation programs 
and activities are not to be criticized, a community may 
easily thwart original thinking which might have merit 
and usefulness. It is conceivable that had Iowa communi­
ties not been so intolerant of those who repudiated certain 
campaigns we might more quickly have learned better pro­
cedures. But if the community can hear no word of criti­
cism, constructive thinking is as dangerous to the thinker 
as destructive thinking. War demands new ideas in com­
munity life as well as in armaments, and by availing our­
selves of strong arm methods of suppression we lost some 
of the all-important power of adaptability.10 When the 
community sentiment became so strong that critical dis­
cussion of means of reaching our goals was taboo and “un- 
American,” we sacrificed some of our possibilities of in­
creased efficiency.
10 Perhaps one could say that If the non-Partisan League had not been sup­
pressed in Iowa during the war and if its proposals had been accepted for modifi­
cation by the leaders of Iowa agriculture, the adjustments during the 20’s and 
early 30’s could have been attained more easily and at less social cost.
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THE CONVERGENCE OF THE SEPARATE THEMES
Gradually, with time and struggle and organization and 
success, the threads of community life were becoming knit 
together into a clearer pattern of organization, sentiment, 
unity in service and sacrifice—the community in wartime. 
All the organizational programs and efforts to serve, the 
rallies and campaigns and ceremonies, the attitudes of de­
votion to the nation, the insistent pleas and demands for 
equality of sacrifice, all the pressures of public opinion 
and the devices for overpowering the weakly patriotic—all 
phases of service, sentiment and sacrifice which have been 
portrayed in this study moved spasmodically but certainly 
toward a unified plan of organization and a unity of feeling.
One of the most important results of this tendency was 
that many American communities came to look upon them­
selves for the first time as real, coherent, total communities, 
no longer little more than an aggregate of individuals and 
special groups. Every community became more conscious 
of itself. The community saw itself in the mirror of the 
nation’s striving as a cooperating group, living together, 
and destined to a common fate, privileged as well as obliged 
to work together for a common goal.
PREPARING THE IOWA COMMUNITY FOR THE WAR
EMERGENCY
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IOW A COMMUNITIES
From the experiences of participation in the war of 1917- 
18 it is possible to draw out many suggestions to guide 
community leaders and citizens in the present effort. Each 
r reader may see for himself many lessons implied in the
picture presented in preceding pages. The authors, with 
their detailed knowledge of the materials, believe the use­
fulness of this review will be greater if they also indicate 
the main conclusions which they obtain from the facts 
presented.
►' It is recognized that the following general recommenda­
tions would have to be modified when applied to any par­
ticular community. Not every suggestion would be equally 
important in each case. But the following general lines of 
action impress us as being feasible for consideration now.
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Additional policies will be developed as the situation un­
folds. The new circumstances and public agencies which 
have developed since the last war will modify the specific 
application of the program set forth. But these modifica­
tions do not invalidate the practical appropriateness of these 
recommendations. Special arrangements would be called 
for in communities affected by the presence of camps or 
munitions plants.
1. Review the Work of the Particular Community in the
Last W ar.
Historical records, newspaper files, organization reports, 
letters and memoirs of persons who served as leaders are 
sources of material for this purpose. The story of out­
standing achievements will show how much can be accom­
plished with unified effort. It is also especially important, 
in approaching the new crisis, to be informed of the weak 
spots of former programs in order to plan effective means 
of avoiding similar difficulties and errors. Leaders may 
thus foresee many of the special problems which their com­
munity will face in the present crisis.
2. Organize a Local Integrating Council on a Community
Basis.
Intelligent coordination is the key to strong programs. 
The local committee should be truly representative of the 
community with all its important groups and organizations. 
Not merely towns, not farmers only, not just a few special 
interest groups enjoying high prestige or power should 
make up this committee. All of the areas and activities in 
which people participate in the life of the community should 
be brought together.
On the evidence of our study we suggest that this com­
mittee should differ in structure and function from many 
of the county councils of defense set up for the last war.
(a) The body should directly represent local organiza­
tions and not have its leadership depend upon outside ap­
pointments.
(b) It should be set up as far as possible on a genuine 
community basis in addition to the usual county basis. 
Necessarily, there will be linkages with county civilian de­
fense boards.
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(c) This integrating group should not be responsible di­
rectly for campaigns, but rather for coordinating them.
(d) In order to avoid overlapping and scattering of ener­
gies, this committee should maintain a calendar of local 
civilian war activities. Thus it can be possible to stop, 
postpone, or initiate campaigns and projects to prevent over­
lapping and ineffective utilization of time and resources.
(e) It should serve as an effective clearing house and 
regulatory and advisory bureau for all civilian war activi­
ties carried on locally. Outside organizers and agencies 
should operate with the express recognition and counsel of 
this board.
(f) It would be advisable for this council to seek and ac­
cept the advice and services of professional consultants 
working on county, state, or national levels. These special­
ists in organization and personnel problems are available 
in the Extension Service, government bureaus, state colleges 
and special organizations, as the Red Cross.
3. Special Sub-Committees Should Be Set up as Branches 
of the Council to Handle Those Problems Which W ill Cer­
tainly Be Troublesome in the Coming Crisis.
(a) Committee on equitable assessments and contribu­
tions.
We may expect that a new war will bring with it the 
necessity of large-scale voluntary contribution to cam­
paigns and programs. Community quotas, and perhaps in­
dividual quotas, will probably appear. If a contribution or 
assessment policy, adapted to the particular community, can 
be devised before the war campaigns appear, many of the 
inequalities and unfortunate pressures exerted on loyal citi­
zens may be avoided. This committee would not be an en­
forcing agency, but rather a device for orderly and equit­
able collection of funds whatever the specific program.
(b) Committee on disloyal behavior.
This group would have as its function the prevention and 
treatment of non-criminal charges of seditious or disloyal 
behavior; it would hear complaints against citizens and 
would cooperate with peace officers in cases of serious con­
sequence. No other extra-legal court, vigilante, or pro­
tective associations should be tolerated. It is suggested
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that several members of this committee be elderly, well- 
known and respected residents of the community who might 
explain situations to ill-informed objectors. Unquestion­
ably, ignorance rather than malice was at the root of 
a large proportion of “sedition”  charges in 1917-18 and al­
so unpatriotic acts themselves. Kindly explanations would 
in the long run gain more lasting cooperation among the 
misinformed or suspicious than immediate publication and 
branding as “ slackers.”  Even in time of war “ secret 
police” and ”mob courts”  are extremely disruptive methods 
of controlling a democratic community.
It is further suggested that this committee, if the situ­
ation warrants it, have in its membership “ambassadors” 
to send to nearby communities which are allegedly disloyal. 
If such emissaries could themselves be loyal German- 
American Iowans they might even better instill patriotism 
into the hearts of doubters. Certainly the dispatching of 
“ real folks” into such areas of potential difficulty to coun­
sel, suggest and assist, would be far superior, in nearly 
every instance, to tactless mass warnings by the secret ser­
vice or U. S. marshalls. It should be understood that local 
and state peace officers would transfer all complaints, ex­
cept those of criminal nature, to this committee.
(c) Committee on public forums.
This group would organize, plan and publicize community 
forums and discussions on topics relating to defense or the 
war, and the kind of peace “ this ” community would like to 
see. Such an organization might assist notably in the pre­
vention of mass hysterics and in stimulating critical think­
ing and post-war planning at a time when these are most 
difficult and most needed. This committee also might well 
act as an intermediary through which citizens would feel 
free to criticise constructively specific aspects of both local 
and national programs.
(d) Committee on standards.
This committee would cooperate with national programs, 
such as the Red Cross, involving work by local persons, al­
though it would in no sense replace the enforcement of 
standards by those organizations. It would serve as a stim­
ulator of quality by offering rewards or honors as well as
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the usual emblems for quantity. It would interpret and 
help maintain the specific requirements of different pro­
grams in the local community.
4. Survey Local Leadership.
A canvas of present and previous leaders, professional 
and specialist help available, and particularly of individuals 
who have not but could serve as leaders, would be of great 
value. We may expect again that leaders will be attracted 
out of local communities, and it is desirable to begin re­
cruiting new leadership. Medical service, especially, 
should be studied in order to plan new arrangements to 
utilize the remaining doctors and nurses most efficiently.
5. List Local Organizations Available for Civilian W ar
W ork.
A census of organizations and groups should be made and 
their special qualifications for service tabulated in order 
that new programs or activities may be allocated quickly 
and the various organizational resources most effectively 
utilized. Existing organizations, properly integrated, are 
more effective than the creation of new organizations with 
each war program.
6. Prepare Plans to Minimize Slumps in W ar Work.
Spurts of enthusiasm and periods of low activity should
be expected in local war work. Special planning to fore­
stall vacation slumps should be made, adapted to the char­
acter of each community. It should also be recognized that 
the enthusiasm of “ society” leaders as initiators of activity 
will likely subside into ineffectiveness unless programs they 
begin are taken up by the community.
7. Protect Necessary Regular Peacetime Programs 
Against Unnecessary Interruptions from W ar W ork.
We should recognize that some institutions and organiza- 
itons have essential functions apart from “winning, the 
war.” Let us remember that education, for example, must 
be continued in spite of the need for “peach pit collections,” 
or farm labor. Of special danger is the introduction of 
emotionalism into the school system. The fleeting emo­
tions and suspicion of wartime may well leave life-long 
impressions upon the child who is, we trust, preparing for 
a life of more normal thoughts and actions.
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8. Attem pt to Keep Emotionalism W ithin Bounds.
Everyone recognizes that morale must be built and sus­
tained. But it is advisable to scrutinize the methods used 
to arouse enthusiasm. We can have campaigns which put 
people into the mood to accept anything, but the success 
of such unrestrained efforts would also create greater sus­
ceptibility to false rumor, vicious gossip and mob violence. 
These acts take away the life breath of democracy and pre­
vent constructive thinking in the community. We can 
arouse enthusiasm by methods which build on love for coun­
try and community as well as by hatred of the foe. Morale 
may be built upon symbols of hate or symbols of patriotism 
and wider loyalty. We should have learned that use of hate 
prevents wise planning for the new period of peace.
9. Prevention of Jealousies and Conflicts in W ar Service.
Consideration should be given to a Red Cross organiza­
tion plan utilized so successfully in one county that inter­
community jealousies were practically eliminated. Instead 
of permitting one town in the county to hold the Red Cross 
charter for the area—thus making other communities sub­
sidiary to it—this plan called for a chartered county-wide 
committee to which all towns were subsidiaries. This plan 
would be equally usable for other organizations.
In contests between organizations and communities for 
achievement, let public stimulants be directed toward the 
goal and its achievement rather than toward outdoing oth­
ers. The emphasis given by leaders can do much to foster 
or prevent the emergence of conflict out of wholesome com­
petition or rivalry.
10. Organization and Planning for W ar Activities Should 
Be Carried Out Promptly.
While circumstances will undoubtedy necessitate many 
modifications, there are distinct advantages in advance 
‘‘blue prints.” Tensions are psychologically unfavorable to 
comprehensive planning. The crisis necessitates immediate 
action, and time which ought to be spent on planning is 
then needed for direct service. Plans, objectives and war 
aims reached under calmer circumstances may later provide 
a sober measuring rod for new policies and actions dictated 
by later war emotions.
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